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ANTITRUST AND COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS
MARK R. LEE*
Broad scope arbitration clauses appear in many of the written
agreements that help govern on-going commercial relationships.
Presumably, they appear frequently because a promise to arbitrate
disputes growing out of such relationships is of substantial value to
many enterprises. The reason it is of value is that it permits the
beneficiary of the promise to economize on transaction costs-not
only the cost of enforcing the agreement of which the promise is a
part, but also, as I shall explain shortly,1 the cost of negotiating
that agreement in the first place. Of course, just how much value
any promise has depends on the beneficiary's perception of how
likely it is that the party who made it will keep it; and for promises
to arbitrate, that is where antitrust law comes into play.
The United States courts of appeal for seven of the circuits,
beginning with the Second Circuit in American Safety Equipment
Corp. v. J.P. McGuire & Co., 2 have ruled that, when it comes to
antitrust claims, federal courts shall not enforce such promises.3
* Professor of Law, Southern Illinois University School of Law, Carbondale, Illinois.
B.A. 1971, Yale University; J.D. 1974, University of Texas.
In writing this Article, the author had the benefit of research assistance provided by
Kendra Mitchell, Michael C. Upperman, and Daniel Slayden.
' See infra note 45.
2 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
3 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir.
1983), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Applied Digital Tech-
nology, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 576 F.2d 116 (7th Cir. 1978); Cobb v. Lewis, 488
F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974); Buffier v. Electronic Computer Programming Inst., Inc., 466 F.2d
694 (6th Cir. 1972); Helfenbein v. International Indus., 438 F.2d 1068 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
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The implications of this judicially created doctrine are far broader
than its narrow language might suggest. This is so because it is
easy to state an antitrust claim that will survive a motion to dis-
miss or even a motion for summary judgment. In particular, it is
easy to characterize many of the terms of ordinary commercial
agreements, and many of the dealings between the parties to those
agreements, as either "restraints of trade" or "monopolizing" prac-
tices. And it is child's play to make claims for breach of contract or
tortious interference with a commercial relationship sound in anti-
trust. As a result, if one party to a commercial agreement contain-
ing an arbitration clause wished to avoid or substantially delay the
arbitration of a dispute with the other party, he would probably
experience little difficulty successfully invoking the American
Safety doctrine.4 In short, because of this doctrine, enforcing
promises to arbitrate is rather problematic. The more problematic
it is to enforce arbitration clauses, the less likely it is that the par-
ties who made the promises will keep them-and the beneficiaries
undoubtedly perceive this. Thus, in the final analysis, the doctrine
reduces the value of all such promises-in my judgment,
significantly.
Consider the consequences. Because promises to arbitrate are
valuable only in so far as they permit the beneficiaries to econo-
mize on transaction costs, a reduction in their value necessarily im-
plies an increase in those costs. Increases in transaction costs al-
ways result in decreases in the rate of exchange. People make
fewer exchanges, and in the exchanges that they do make, they ex-
change goods having less total value. It is not at all clear that these
consequences are consistent with, much less required by, the anti-
trust laws in whose name they have been wrought.
Although its consequences seem perverse, the doctrine could
be justified if the controlling statutes clearly required it, but they
do not. Courts embracing the American Safety doctrine have done
nied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710 (9th Cir.
1968). The strong public policy in favor of arbitration has been held to be outweighed by a
judicially created exception favoring judicial resolution of antitrust claims. See Mitsubishi
Motors Corp., 723 F.2d at 162.
' After a party successfully invokes the American Safety doctrine, the court must de-
cide whether to permit or to stay the arbitration of nonantitrust claims. If the court finds
that the antitrust claims "permeate" the dispute, it normally orders a stay. See Mitsubishi
Motors Corp., 723 F.2d at 169. See also infra note 21 (factual and procedural setting of
Mitsubishi).
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so despite, not because of, the language of those statutes.' The
Federal Arbitration Act6 requires courts to compel the arbitration
of all claims that are arguably covered by an arbitration clause
valid under traditional contract principles;7 and neither that act
nor the Sherman or Clayton Acts expressly exempt antitrust
claims from this requirement." Since the doctrine lacks a statutory
mandate and has perverse consequences, one might have expected
that courts embracing it would have gone to great lengths to ex-
plain the doctrine's rationale, but they have not. In fact, they have
never even expressed the rationale clearly.
Perhaps none exists. The doctrine may be no more than a na-
ive extension of populist notions about the distribution of wealth
which sometimes infects antitrust decision-making.9 The courts,
however, have identified four factors that purportedly support the
doctrine. Three of them, even when dressed up as arguments, are
makeweights. Dressed up, the three are: courts should not compel
the arbitration of antitrust claims because (1) the judicial process
is better suited than the arbitral process to resolving the complex
issues sometimes raised by these claims and to handling the di-
verse and extensive evidence sometimes offered in connection with
litigating them;10 (2) commercial arbitrators are likely to harbor
hostility toward antitrust law;11 and (3) the contracts containing
the applicable arbitration clauses are likely to be "contracts of ad-
hesion. '12 As I shall show in the course of reconsidering the doc-
trine, these arguments are either facially unsound or rest on prem-
ises that are at best questionable; and they bear little, if any,
relevance to the type of antitrust claim that is likely to be subject
to an arbitration clause.
The fourth factor that purportedly supports the American
Safety doctrine, when presented as a sophisticated argument,13
1 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 723 F.2d at 162 (court carved out exception to
federal statute which represented a strong public policy in favor of arbitration).
0 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
7 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); Perry v. Thomas, 107 S. Ct. 2520 (1987); Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985); Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
8 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)); Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.).
I See infra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
10 American Safety, 391 F.2d at 827.
I1 /d.
12 Id. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
5 American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826. The Second Circuit stated: "we lind in this case
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does not suffer these flaws. The argument is that federal courts
should not compel the arbitration of antitrust claims because doing
so would tend to reduce the deterrent effect of antitrust law.14 It
would do that, according to this argument, primarily by reducing
the incentive to pursue private antitrust suits. This incentive
would allegedly decline because arbitrators would tend to deal with
antitrust claims differently than would judges. In particular, arbi-
trators would more likely err in favor of defendants either by
resolving antitrust claims incorrectly on the merits or by failing to
award treble damages and attorney's fees. This argument-the "re-
duced deterrence argument"-is the doctrine's core.1 5 It even rests,
in part, on the other "arguments," the three makeweights. To illus-
trate, if commercial arbitrators did harbor hostility toward anti-
trust law then, ceteris paribus, they would be more likely than
judges to err in favor of antitrust defendants. The reduced deter-
rence argument does not rest entirely, however, on these make-
weights. It also rests, for example, on the proposition that commer-
cial arbitrators, unlike judges, are not bound to apply antitrust law
when presented with a claim arising under that law. So the re-
duced deterrence argument is not a makeweight, but it has yet to
undergo thorough analysis.1 6 In particular, it has yet to be ex-
amined in light of (a) post-American Safety scholarship that bears
directly on the argument-recent advances in the theory of adjudi-
cation,17 and the "new learning" about optimal damages and deter-
[a] conflict between federal statutory protection of a large segment of the public, fre-
quently in an inferior bargaining position, and encouragement of arbitration as a 'prompt,
economical and adequate solution of controversies.'" Id. (quoting Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427, 438 (1953)).
1" See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
The Supreme Court, in Mitsubishi, rejected three of the American Safety factors but ac-
cepted the fourth factor; namely, the importance of the "regime of the antitrust laws" to the
American capitalist system. Id. at 634. To their credit, some American Safety proponents
have advanced an argument of this sort. See, e.g., Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust En-
forcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1072 (1969) (appropriateness of arbitration should be deter-
mined by applicability of the issues rather than exclusive favoring of public interest).
" Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 635.
1" One of the best analyses to date is in Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust
Claims: The Need for Enhanced Accommodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L.
REv. 219, 251-59 (1986). Points related to the "reduced deterrence" argument appear in
some of the articles bearing on the American Safety doctrine. See, e.g., Aksen, Arbitration
and Antitrust-Are They Compatible?, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1097, 1100 (1969); Loevinger, An-
titrust Issues as Subjects of Arbitration, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1085, 1090 (1969); Pitofsky,
supra note 14, at 1079-80; Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examina-
tion of the Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDozo L. REv. 481 (1981).
'" See, e.g., Private Alternatives to the Judicial Process, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 231-415
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rence,15 and (b) post-American Safety developments in antitrust
law, especially the decline of populism and the rise of efficiency as
the touchstone of antitrust jurisprudence. I undertake that exami-
nation in this Article.
Given the perverse consequences of the American Safety doc-
trine, the failure of the applicable statutes to lend any support to
it, and the unhelpful or unexamined reasoning offered by the
courts to justify it, reconsideration of the doctrine in light of first
principles is clearly in order. The Supreme Court's recent decisions
in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc."9 and
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon2" make reconsider-
ation timely.
In Mitsubishi, the Court upheld an order compelling the arbi-
tration of antitrust claims where they arose in an international set-
ting.21 There are two features of the Mitsubishi opinion, each rein-
(1979) (symposium issue). See also R. POSNER, ECONoMmc ANALYSIS OF LAW 500-15 (3d ed.
1986); Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984); Kaplow, Private Versus Social Costs in Bringing Suit, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 371
(1986); Landes & Posner, Adjudication As a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979)
[hereinafter Landes & Posner, Private Good]; Landes & Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theo-
retical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J. L. & EcoN. 249 (1976); Priest, The Common Law Pro-
cess and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 65 (1977); Priest & Klein, The
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); Rubin, Why is the Com-
mon Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 393 (1978).
11 See Breit & Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning, 28 J.L. &
EcoN. 405, 407-13 (1985) (coined the phrase "new learning"). Gary Becker probably gave
birth to the "new learning" in his seminal article, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). Others, however, have made notable contributions to
its development. See, e.g., W. SCHWARTZ, PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS: AN
ECONOMIC CRITIQUE (1981); Easterbook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 289 (1983); Friedman, Efficient Institutions for the Private Enforcement of Law,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 379 (1984); Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U.
CHI. L. REv. 652 (1983); Landes & Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1975); Polinsky & Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and
Magnitude of Fines, 69 AMu. EcoN. REV. 880 (1979); Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of
Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970); Stigler & Becker, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974).
19 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
2- 482 U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
21 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 616. Like too many other private antitrust cases, this one
arose out of a once rosy franchise relationship that faded-badly. On the franchisor side of
the relationship were Chrysler International, S.A. ("CISA"), Chrysler's Swiss-incorporated
subsidiary, through which the parent distributed vehicles outside of the continental United
States, and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation ("Mitsubishi"), a joint venture of CISA and
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Inc., the Japanese conglomerate. Id. Under the joint venture
agreement, Mitsubishi manufactured cars and trucks and CISA-franchised dealers retailed
them. Id. at 617.
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forced by Shearson, that make reconsideration timely. One is the
opinion's assault on the arguments advanced in support of the
American Safety doctrine. Confessing to some "skepticism of cer-
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth became one of those dealers in 1979. Soler was the party on
the franchisee side of the relationship. Id. In a "Sales Procedure Agreement" Mitsubishi
promised to supply vehicles and parts while Soler promised to discharge certain sales-re-
lated responsibilities. In particular, Soler promised: that it would sell some minimum num-
ber of vehicles annually-the number to be determined by mutual agreement each year;
that it would sell those vehicles only within its assigned territory, which was the San Juan
area of Puerto Rico; and that if it ever refused to take delivery of vehicles that it had or-
dered or was obliged to order, it would pay Mitsubishi not only all amounts due on their
wholesale price but also storage fees and penalties. See id. at 617-18. Soler further promised
that it would arbitrate disputes with Mitsubishi related to these promises and most of the
other promises memorialized in the Sales Procedure Agreement. The agreement provided
that all disputes would be arbitrated in Japan in accordance with the rules and regulations
of the Japanese Commercial Arbitration Association. Id. at 617.
By 1981, the bloom was off the franchise rose. Apparently, the number of new cars
demanded in Soler's assigned territory turned out to be far smaller than the number Soler
had anticipated when it agreed to its annual minimum for that year. Id. In any event, it did
not sell as many cars as it had promised to sell. Id. In what was perhaps an effort to avoid
reneging on that promise, Soler asked for a release from its other promise, to sell vehicles
only in its assigned territory. See id. Mitsubishi, however, denied the request, citing reasons
related for the most part to quality control and goodwill. Id. at 618. At about the same time,
Soler began to refuse to take delivery of vehicles that it had ordered or was obliged to order,
zo that in the end Mitsubishi had stored almost 1000 vehicles in Japan that allegedly be-
longed to Soler. Id. at 618. The end came when Soler disclaimed any financial responsibility
for those vehicles. Id.
Mitsubishi's efforts to obtain satisfaction informally on its claims against Soler came to
naught. After its call for arbitration was refused, Mitsubishi petitioned the District Court
for the District of Puerto Rico-pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act and the Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 29, 1970), as imple-
mented by 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 of that Act-for an order compelling arbitration of its claims
against Soler. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 618-19. Solar disputed those claims and counter-
claimed that Mitsubishi had, inter alia, violated the antitrust laws by entering into an
agreement with Chrysler to "divide markets," pursuant to which it had (1) denied Soler's
request to sell vehicles outside of Soler's assigned territory; (2) refused to ship vehicles that
would be suitable for sale elsewhere and refused to ship parts, like heaters and defoggers,
that Solar required to make the vehicles on hand suitable for such sale; and (3) terminated
Soler's dealership. Id. at 620. Invoking the American Safety doctrine, inter alia, Solar
moved that the court deny Mitsubishi's petition. Id. at 620-21.
The court denied Soler's motion and granted Mitsubishi's petition. Id. at 620. On ap-
peal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed in part and affirmed
in part holding, inter alia, that the district court could not compel the arbitration of Soler's
antitrust counterclaims or Mitsubishi's related claims. See Mitsubishi, 723 F.2d 155, 169
(1st Cir. 1983). The court remanded the case so that the district court could decide whether
to permit or stay the arbitration of the parties' other claims, a decision that the First Circuit
said would turn on whether the antitrust counterclaims "permeated" the case and on the
likelihood that Soler would prevail on those counterclaims. Id. Both parties then success-
fully petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 624.
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tain aspects of the American Safety doctrine, 22 the Court demol-
ished the three makeweight arguments. By doing so, it necessarily
undermined the foundation upon which the reduced deterrence ar-
gument rests. The Court further undermined this foundation by
suggesting-if not holding-that commercial arbitrators con-
fronted with antitrust claims might be obliged to apply antitrust
law.23
The Court continued its destructive handiwork in Shearson.
Shearson involved a claim by two investors that their brokers had
violated section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193424 by
churning their account and by giving them advice that included
misstatements and excluded material information.2 5 The trading
agreement into which the parties had entered when the investors
opened their account contained a broad scope arbitration clause.26
Nevertheless, the investors resisted arbitration, relying on Wilko v.
Swan,27 a 1953 decision in which the Supreme Court refused to
compel the arbitration of claims arising under section 12(2) of a
companion statute, the Securities Act of 1933.28 The Wilko opinion
advanced arguments analogous to the arguments advanced in sup-
port of the American Safety doctrine.29 In fact, in formulating the
doctrine, the American Safety court relied heavily on those argu-
ments and on the Wilko decision.30 In Shearson, the Supreme
Court attacked the Wilko arguments, making considerable use of
Mitsubishi, and upheld the district court's order.3'
The other feature of the Mitsubishi opinion that makes recon-
sideration timely is that it supplies a test for determining the arbi-
trability of all antitrust claims, be they claims arising in an inter-
national or a domestic setting. The test is whether compelling
arbitration would likely yield more gains or more losses in terms of
effectuating the policies implicated by such compulsion. The Court
22 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632.
23 Id. at 636-37.
24 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982).
25 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. 2332 (1987).
26 Id.
27 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
28 15 U.S.C. §771(2) (1982). See 482 U.S. at - , 107 S. Ct. at 2341-42.
"' See Wilko, 346 U.S. at 435-38.
20 See American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 825 (2d Cir.
1968).
21 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S .... 107 S. Ct. 2332,
2343-46 (1987).
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did not expressly adopt this test, but it is the one that is most
consistent with its justification for the decision. The Court ob-
served that, in an international setting, compelling arbitration im-
plicated both the policy of the antitrust laws and the policies cap-
tured by the phrase "international comity." 2 The Court assumed
that compelling arbitration would yield losses in terms of effectuat-
ing antitrust policy. The Court was obliged to make this assump-
tion because it is the central premise of the American Safety doc-
trine and the Court was unwilling to repudiate the doctrine.3 3 The
Court predicted, however, that these losses would be minimal-a
prediction based on its critical analysis of the "arguments" sup-
porting the doctrine. 4 Conversely, it predicted that compelling ar-
bitration would yield gains in terms of effectuating the policies
captured by the phrase "international comity" and that those
gains would be considerable. Because the probable gains exceeded
the probable losses, the Court concluded that antitrust claims aris-
ing in an international setting are arbitrable. 5
For claims arising in a domestic setting, the claims explicitly
addressed by American Safety, the test for determining arbi-
trability in an international setting should remain the same-only
the implicated policies should vary. Indeed, in its Shearson opin-
ion, the Court minimized the importance of the international/do-
32 See 473 U.S. at 629.
3 Id. The Court said, "[w]e find it unnecessary to assess the legitimacy of the Ameri-
can Safety doctrine as applied to agreements to arbitrate arising from domestic transac-
tions." Id. Of course, if the Court had repudiated the doctrine, the Court would have found
it unnecessary to consider the matters that it asserted were determinative: "concerns of
international comity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and
sensitivity to the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the reso-
lution of disputes." Id.
11 See id. at 632-38. In its critical analysis, the Court stated that "[t]he mere appear-
ance of an antitrust dispute does not alone warrant invalidation of the selected forum on the
undemonstrated assumption that the arbitration clause is tainted" since a party that wants
to avoid arbitration may always attack the validity of the agreement. Id. at 632. Complexity
of the issues should not "suffice to ward off arbitration" since the same courts that follow
American Safety have allowed arbitration after the dispute arises. Id. at 633. The Court
also rejected the suggestion that arbitration panels will be innately hostile to the constraints
on business conduct that antitrust law imposes since those panels are made up of individu-
als from the business and legal community. Id. at 634. The Court finally addressed the core
argument of American Safety by saying that there is no reason to assume that an interna-
tional tribunal will be biased to the norms of particular states but instead it will "effectuate
the intentions of the parties." Id. at 636. If the parties choose to be subject to the American
antitrust law, the tribunal "should be bound to decide that dispute in accord with the na-
tional law giving rise to the claim." Id. at 636-37.
11 Id. at 640.
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mestic distinction for resolving issues of arbitrability. 6 The Court
did acknowledge that it had previously compelled the arbitration
of a claim arising under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 only in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,37 an interna-
tional case, and that it had done so on the assumption that Wilko
would have required a different result in a domestic case.38 The
Court stated, however, that the setting had little relevance to the
arguments bearing on arbitrability and used the Mitsubishi facts
to illustrate its argument, notwithstanding the Mitsubishi opin-
ion's reliance on Scherk and the international/domestic distinction
that Scherk drew. 0
When employing the test suggested by Mitsubishi in the do-
mestic setting, the critical policy would be that of the antitrust
laws since the only other policy that is even relevant is that of the
Federal Arbitration Act which obviously militates in favor of arbi-
trability. Therefore, the arbitrability of antitrust claims arising in
the domestic setting should turn on whether compelling arbitration
would probably yield more gains or more losses in terms of effectu-
ating antitrust policy. This is precisely the question which a recon-
sideration of the doctrine must address.
The reconsideration undertaken in this Article shows that
compelling antitrust claims to arbitration would almost certainly
effectuate antitrust policy. This conclusion holds regardless of
whether antitrust policy is defined exclusively as maximizing effi-
ciency or-mistakenly in my opinion-as some combination of
maximizing efficiency and redistributing wealth in a manner that
purportedly furthers populist goals. To bring this point home, I
have divided this reconsideration into two parts, one corresponding
to each definition of antitrust policy.
Accordingly, Part I analyzes the likely consequences of com-
pelling the arbitration of antitrust claims in terms of efficiency. It
consists of two sections, the first devoted to readily apparent effi-
ciency gains and the second to purported efficiency losses. Because
promises to arbitrate are supposed to yield efficiency gains, the
30 See Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. - , 107 S. Ct. 2332,
2338-39 (1987).
37 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
38 See Shearson, 482 U.S. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 2339 (Wilko bars "waiver of judicial
forum only where arbitration is inadequate to protect substantive rights at issue").
9 See id. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 2338-39.
10 Id. at -, 107 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
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first section focuses on the function served by such promises. Once
this function is understood, these gains should become readily
apparent.
Of course, there are no corresponding losses, so the second sec-
tion analyzes purported efficiency losses-those that the propo-
nents of the American Safety doctrine allege would result if courts
compelled the arbitration of antitrust claims. These allegations are
implicit in their arguments. Thus, the principal purported effi-
ciency loss-the one on which the analysis concentrates-is the
loss implicit in the reduced deterrence argument, the proponent's
only non-makeweight. Recall that they predict that compelling the
arbitration of antitrust claims would reduce the deterrent effect of
antitrust law. A reduction in deterrence would necessarily entail an
increase in the number and scope of unpunished antitrust offenses.
The implicit allegation is that this increase would result in an effi-
ciency loss.
I treat this purported loss in three subsections. Each corre-
sponds to one of the ways in which American Safety proponents
predict that compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims would
reduce the law's deterrent effect. The three are: (i) decreasing the
number of antitrust opinions that are published; (ii) increasing the
proportion of antitrust decisions that are incorrect on the merits;
and, most importantly, (iii) decreasing the number of antitrust
claims that are pursued. The analysis shows not only that the pre-
dicted effects are unlikely to materialize, but that even if they did,
they would have no appreciable impact on antitrust deterrence.
More surprisingly, the analysis also shows that if they were to ap-
preciably reduce deterrence, this reduction would be efficient.
To summarize, Part I of this reconsideration shows that, in
terms of efficiency, the gains from compelling the arbitration of an-
titrust claims would probably dwarf the losses, if indeed there
would be any losses. Part II shows that, in terms of wealth redistri-
bution, compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims would proba-
bly have negligible consequences. Thus, no matter how antitrust
policy is defined, compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims
would effectuate that policy-contrary to the American Safety
doctrine.
[Vol. 62:1
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I. THE EFFICIENCY CONSEQUENCES OF COMPELLING ANTITRUST
CLAIMS TO ARBITRATION
A. Readily Apparent Efficiency Gains
Whatever other consequences compelling the arbitration of
antitrust claims might have, it would at minimum permit promises
to arbitrate to serve their intended function more effectively. This
function must be an instrumental one since people do not ex-
change promises to arbitrate independent of an agreemdnt to ex-
change other products or services. These promises must help effec-
tuate the exchanges-or patterns of exchange-contemplated by
the written agreements of which they are a part.
Promises to arbitrate can serve this function in two ways.
First, they may enable the parties to economize on the cost of en-
forcing their agreement. For example, the parties may find it
cheaper in terms of out-of-pocket expenses to resort to arbitration
rather than traditional litigation in order to remedy breaches of
their agreement. And, cheaper or not, they may find it more cost
effective. 41 This is so largely because arbitration may do less harm
to intangible capital that is of considerable value to one or both of
the parties. This capital might be whatever remains of their mu-
tual goodwill. Alternatively, it might be the reputation one of them
enjoys among his other commercial relations-specifically those re-
lations who either occupy, or contemplate occupying, the same
kind of position as that occupied by the other party to the dispute.
To illustrate, the arbitration of a dispute between a car manufac-
turer, like Mitsubishi, and one of its franchised dealers might do
less harm than traditional litigation, not only to their mutual good-
will, but also to the manufacturer's reputation among its more
satisified dealers. Such intangible capital is likely to be of consider-
able value where the parties have exchanged promises to arbitrate
because the relationships typically involved are continuing ones.42
4, See Allison, supra note 16, at 221-22 (arbitration normally faster and cheaper means
for settling controversies than litigation); see also Ferguson, The Adjudication of Commer-
cial Disputes and the Legal System in Modern England, 7 BRIT. J.L. & Soc'y 141, 146-47
(1980) (commercial preference for arbitration obviously attributable to some extent to speed
and economy); Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUm. L. REV. 846, 850 (1961)
("reasons ... for arbitration-speed, lower expense, more expert decision, greater privacy").
42 See Allison, supra note 16, at 222. "In most cases in which the antitrust arbitrability
issue arises, the underlying transaction involves a franchise, a licensing agreement, or some
other arrangement that normally contemplates a business relationship of substantial dura-
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Promises to arbitrate may permit the parties to take relatively
efficient enforcement action, but this hardly exhausts their poten-
tial for economizing on enforcement costs. The very prospect of
arbitration may significantly reduce the number of occasions for
taking any enforcement action at all. The parties will know quite a
bit about the likely arbitrator-his experience and his familiarity
with their agreement, the customs and practices of their mar-
ket-and about the incentives he will face as a privately-employed
dispute resolver.43 As a result, they may enjoy a greater degree of
certainty about the outcome of arbitration than they would about
the outcome of traditional litigation. Their knowledge of the likely
arbitrator may give them more confidence that he would under-
stand their agreement, in particular their specifications of how
they want to respond in the event of various occurrences; and their
knowledge of his incentives may give them more confidence that he
would resolve any disputes triggered by these occurrences accord-
ingly.4 4 The greater the parties' certainty about the outcome of ar-
bitration, the less they would have to gain by engaging in opportu-
nistic behavior that might either generate a dispute or hold up the
settlement of one.
Perhaps it goes without saying that by enabling the parties to
economize on the cost of enforcing their agreement, promises to
arbitrate help effectuate the exchange of products and services. As
a result, the parties may secure at lower cost the benefits for which
they bargained. What is most helpful about enforcement econo-
mies, however, is not their realization but their anticipation. If an-
ticipated, the parties are more likely to agree to an exchange and
to exchange more.
Promises to arbitrate may help effectuate exchange in another
way as well. They may enable the parties to economize on the cost
of negotiating their agreement. Once again, the explanation for this
is rooted in the parties' knowledge of the likely arbitrator and his
incentives and the relative certainty about the outcome of arbitra-
tion which that knowledge may give them.45 Here, however, our
tion and scope and with recurrent contact between the parties." Id. at 239 (footnotes
omitted).
"' See Mentschikoff, supra note 41, at 850-51 (discussion of advantages of industry
knowledgeable arbitrators as opposed to disadvantages of industry-naive courts).
44 See Sterk, supra note 16, at 481 n.9.
" The savings are likely to be great, especially when the parties are from more than one
country as they were in Mitsubishi. Each may have considerable doubt about how a court in
the other party's country would resolve a dispute.
[Vol. 62:1
ANTITRUST AND ARBITRATION
focus shifts to disputes triggered by occurrences for which the par-
ties fail to provide. There are always such occurrences, and they
are the ones that are most likely to trigger disputes. Knowledge of
the likely arbitrator would give the parties more confidence that, in
the event of such a dispute, he could do an acceptable job of figur-
ing out what they would have provided had they anticipated the
triggering occurrence and specified how they wished to respond.
Knowledge of the arbitrator's incentives would give them more
confidence that he would resolve such a dispute in accordance with
that nonexisting provision. It is this confidence that would make
the parties more certain about the outcome of these disputes. The
greater their certainty about the outcome, the less risk they would
associate with failure to provide for occurrences and, therefore, the
more readily they would substitute promises to arbitrate for such
provisions. It is by substituting for such provisions that promises
to arbitrate may help the parties to economize on negotiating
costs. It is difficult not only to anticipate occurrences, but, also,
having anticipated them, to specify how the parties wish to re-
spond to them. "Difficult" means "expensive," and the more the
parties try to anticipate and specify, the more expensive these ac-
tivities become. Indeed, providing for occurrences is one of the
principal costs of negotiating an exchange agreement. Minimizing
these costs may permit the parties to agree to an exchange when
otherwise they would not have agreed, or it may induce them to
exchange more than they otherwise would have exchanged. In
other words, by enabling the parties to economize on negotiating
costs, promises to arbitrate help to effectuate exchange-which is
their intended function.
Of course, they do not always serve their intended function
well; sometimes the people who exchanged the promises will rea-
sonably conclude that they made a mistake by doing so. Enforcing
these "mistaken" promises exacts a price in terms of efficiency, but
trying to avoid paying it by permitting courts to second-guess all
promises to arbitrate would exact an even higher price. Courts
would err. They would enforce some promises that were "mis-
taken," and refuse to enforce some that were not. Most of the er-
rors, however, would probably be refusals to enforce promises that
were not "mistaken" simply because, in the aggregate, promises to
arbitrate must function as they are supposed to function, else peo-
ple would stop exchanging them. The risk that a court might make
one of these errors is what would exact such a high price. This risk
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would reduce the value of all promises to arbitrate.
To the extent that promises to arbitrate serve their intended
function, they tend to maximize efficiency. They help effectuate
the exchange of products and services, and, in the aggregate, ex-
change puts resources to higher value use, which tends to effi-
ciency. Aside from mistakes, there are only two categories of ex-
change that may tend to inefficiency. One consists of exchanges
that are ancillary to cartelization. The other consists of exchanges
that are predatory-"predatory" in Judge Bork's sense of that
word-an action "that would not be considered profit maximizing
except for the expectation either that (1) rivals will be driven from
the market, leaving the predator with market share sufficient to
command monopoly profits, or (2) rivals will be chastened suffi-
ciently to abandon competitive behavior the predator finds incon-
venient or threatening. '4 Exchanges made pursuant to a written
agreement containing a broad scope arbitration clause are unlikely
to fall into either one of these categories. An arbitration clause im-
plies that people who are not parties to the agreement will be in-
volved in its enforcement. Such involvement would be an anath-
ema to the members of a cartel for it would significantly increase
the risk that they would be apprehended. Therefore, exchanges
made pursuant to such an agreement are unlikely to fall into the
ancillary-to-cartelization category. A written agreement of any
kind implies that the parties plan to cooperate with one another.
Such cooperation is hardly the hallmark of actions designed to
crush or chasten rivals, especially when it is the rival's cooperation
that the would-be predator must have in order to succeed. There-
fore, exchanges made pursuant to agreements containing arbitra-
tion clauses are unlikely to fall into the predatory category. We
may conclude, then, that such exchanges probably maximize effi-
ciency. Since the promises to arbitrate embodied in such clauses
probably function to help effectuate these exchanges, and since
compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims permits such
promises to serve this function more effectively, it is readily appar-
ent that such compulsion would yield an efficiency gain.
B. Purported Efficiency Losses
The proponents of the American Safety doctrine do not deny
46 R. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOX 144 (1978); see also Rosenfield, The Use of Eco-
nomics in Antitrust Litigation and Counseling, 1 COLUm. Bus. L. REv. 49, 70-71 (1986).
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that compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims would permit
promises to arbitrate to serve their intended function. more effec-
tively.47 Rather, they assert that it would have other consequences,
all of which would be unpleasant.48 Conveniently, when these con-
sequences are distilled for their relationship to efficiency, they boil
down to a reduction in the deterrent effect of antitrust law. The
proponents of the doctrine assert that this reduction would be
inefficient. They implicitly allege that the readily apparent effi-
ciency gain from compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims
would pale in comparison to this more subtle loss. To evaluate this
allegation, we must analyze both of their assertions: that compel-
ling arbitration would reduce the deterrent effect of antitrust law
and that that reduction would be inefficient.
Recall that American Safety proponents predict that compel-
ling the arbitration of antitrust claims would reduce the deterrent
effect of antitrust law because it would cause (1) a decline in the
number of antitrust opinions that are published; (2) a rise in the
proportion of antitrust decisions that are incorrect on the merits;
and, most importantly, (3) a decline in the number of antitrust
claims that are pursued.49 I will analyze these predictions seriatum.
1. The "Fewer Published Opinions" Prediction
The "fewer published opinions" prediction rests on the follow-
ing chain of logic: compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims
would slow the rate at which such claims would be re-
solved-wholly or partially-through standard litigation; that
slowdown would in turn slow the rate at which antitrust opinions
47 See, e.g., Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 1072-73 (enforcing arbitration clauses would: (1)
speed disposition of complicated commercial litigation; (2) permit more efficient and eco-
nomic disposition of antitrust litigation; (3) reduce judicial burden from protracted multiple
litigations); Sterk, supra note 16 at 504. Sterk puts it this way, "[a]rbitrators are entrusted
with the responsibility of working justice between the parties) [which he defines as protect-
ing their contractual expectations], id. at 491, "[a]ntitrust laws, by contrast, have little to do
with justice between the parties." Id. at 504.
48 See supra note 16. Among these consequences are (1) lack of guidance, in the form of
precedent, for businessmen and lawyers; (2) relatively high error rates; (3) enforcement of
contracts of adhesion; (4) deprivation of important statutorily guaranteed entitlements such
as liberal venue, treble damages and attorney's fees; and (5) inadequate protection of the
"public interest." See also Leovinger, supra note 16, at 1089-91 (twelve disadvantages of
arbitral process applied to antitrust issues); Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 1076-81 (reasons
why arbitration and antitrust incompatible).
" See supra note 48. Although the proponents' predictions could be rearranged or sub-
divided ftirther neither would change the substance of the analysis. Id.
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would be published and hence precedent produced; and a slow-
down in the rate of precedent production would reduce the deter-
rent effect of antitrust law. Problems beset each link in the chain,
and they become progressively more acute.
Consider the link between compelling the arbitration of anti-
trust claims and the rate at which those claims would be resolved
through standard litigation. It is true that compelling arbitration
could slow the rate of such resolutions, but only to the extent that
it diverted a select group of antitrust claims: those that would have
been adjudicated on the merits either on motion or through final
judgment. There is little reason to believe that it would divert
more than a trivial number of such claims. Compelling arbitration
would probably divert some antitrust claims, but the odds are that
the bulk of these claims would be ones that would have been set-
tled prior to any adjudication on the merits.50 Most antitrust
claims are so settled and no doubt would continue to be even if
courts began to compel the arbitration of those subject to an arbi-
tration clause. It is especially likely that antitrust claims diverted
because of compelled arbitration would be ones that would have
been settled since the American Safety doctrine itself creates an
incentive to settle. When invoked, the doctrine makes arbitration
unavailable, and the parties may prefer to settle rather than resort
to the less cost effective and more uncertain alternative of proceed-
ing to judgment.' Moreover, whatever the size of the diversion, its
impact on the resolution of antitrust claims through standard liti-
gation is bound to be smaller. The reason is that as the judiciary
sheds antitrust claims subject to an arbitration clause, it would si-
multaneously acquire others not subject to one.
Even if the rate of resolving antitrust claims through standard
litigation did slow appreciably, it is unlikely that the rate of pub-
lishing antitrust opinions would do likewise. This link is even
weaker than the preceeding one. In the first place, the rate of such
resolutions could have an appreciable impact on the rate of publi-
cation only if antitrust claims subject to an arbitration clause held
the potential for generating an appreciable number of published
opinions. Such claims do not now generate an appreciable number,
60 Compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims would almost surely result in the arbi-
tration of more antitrust claims, but the additional claims would not necessarily be diverted
ones; they might be claims that would not have been pursued at all. See infra notes 107-09
and accompanying text.
61 See R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 522-28.
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and even if we generously allow for an increase in the number of
such claims once courts began compelling them to arbitration, it is
unlikely that they would hold the potential to do so. The fact is
that few antitrust claims of any kind generate published opinions.
Some cannot-those resolved by the parties prior to any adjudica-
tion and those resolved exclusively by juries. The remainder,
claims resolved at least in part by trial judges, often do not. Some-
times trial judges do not issue an opinion, and when they do, they
frequently order it withheld from publication. Of course, antitrust
claims resolved by judges without published opinions and those re-
solved initially by juries, may still generate published opinions.
There may be an appeal. But in the majority of cases, there is no
appeal, and even when there is, appellate judges often follow the
lead of their district court brethren by ordering their opinions
withheld from publication.2
Secondly, whatever the size of the slowdown in resolving anti-
trust claims through standard litigation, the slowdown in the pub-
lication of antitrust opinions would probably be smaller. As the
rate of such resolutions slowed, judges would probably publish
opinions that they otherwise would have ordered withheld from
publication. They might even hear claims generating publishable
opinions that they otherwise would not have heard. For that mat-
ter, to the extent that compelling arbitration would divert claims
from settlement, the rate at which opinions were "published," in
the most general sense, would tend to increase. The arbitral pro-
cess requires the parties to take steps, including the presentation
of their cases, that tend to spread word of a dispute and so its
resolution is more likely to become known to outsiders than if it
had been resolved through settlement.
The link between the rate at which antitrust opinions are pub-
lished and the deterrent effect of antitrust law is the weakest of
the three. In fact, a slowdown in the rate of publication would
probably have no impact on deterrence. To have an impact, the
slowdown would have to cause such a decline in the production of
antitrust precedent that uncertainty about how courts would inter-
pret the law would rise appreciably. A decline of that size, how-
"2 See Reynolds & Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United
States Courts of Appeals: The Price of Reform, 48 U. CHL L. REv. 573, 579-83 (1981). The
Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., and Commerce Clearing House, Inc., do publish some with-
held opinions, or portions of them, in their respective specialized reports, BNA Antitrust &
Trade Regulation Report and CCH Trade Regulation Reports.
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ever, is unlikely to occur. The number of antitrust claims subject
to arbitration clauses would almost certainly be too small to create
even the potential for such a decline. Casual empiricism suggests
that even if the number of claims were large enough, the potential
would not be realized because many of the opinions that would
have purportedly been published-like many of those that are
published-would have added precious little, if anything, to the
existing stock of antitrust precedent. Moreover, any decline in the
production of precedent sufficient to cause an appreciable rise in
uncertainty about how courts would interpret the law would tend
to be self-correcting.5 s The uncertainty would itself spawn addi-
tional litigation-in part, perhaps, because parties would less fre-
quently agree to arbitrate their disputes-and more litigation
would in turn cause a rise in the production of precedent.
To sum up, the fewer published opinions prediction is unlikely
to come true. American Safety proponents are wrong about the
likely consequence of compelling arbitration: it would probably not
cause an appreciable decline in the rate at which antitrust opinions
would be published. And even if they were right about that, they
would nonetheless be wrong about the significance of any such de-
cline: it would probably not trigger a reduction in antitrust deter-
rence. Besides, if this prediction were to come true, the reduction
in deterrence could be remedied by measures which would be more
efficient-and more consistent with the Federal Arbitration
Act-than refusing to compel the arbitration of antitrust claims.
For example, courts could compel arbitration on the condition that
(a) the dispute and its outcome be noted in some readily accessible
registry; or (b) the arbitrator prepare an opinion and file it with
the courts. 4 Of course, imposing either condition would reduce the
potential gains from arbitration-although not by as much as re-
fusing to compel it-but the parties could best evaluate whether
the gains still exceeded the costs.
2. The "More Incorrect Decisions" Prediction
The other two predictions made by American Safety doctrine
53 See generally Landes & Posner, Private Good, supra note 17, at 272-73. When a
court resolves a dispute, its resolution, especially if embodied in a written opinion, provides
information regarding the likely outcome of similar disputes in the future thus quenching
uncertainty through judicial extrapolation of issues. Id.
", See Comment, Commercial Arbitration Under the Federal Act: Expanding the
Scope of Judicial Review, 35 U. Pirr. L. REv. 799, 816 (1975).
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proponents invite similar criticisms. Consider the "more incorrect
decisions" prediction. Its logic is: compelling the arbitration of an-
titrust claims would divert to arbitration some claims that would
have been adjudicated on the merits; this diversion would increase
the proportion of incorrect decisions because arbitration is more
likely than adjudication to produce them; and an increase in the
proportion of incorrect decisions would reduce the deterrent effect
of antitrust law.
Here the critical consequence, of course, is a rise in the pro-
portion of incorrect decisions. Whether American Safety propo-
nents are right or wrong about it depends largely on whether arbi-
tration is really more likely than adjudication to produce incorrect
decisions. 55 It would be quite difficult to prove empirically that ei-
ther process is more likely than the other to produce incorrect de-
cisions. The nonpublic nature of arbitration proceedings would
make collecting information regarding outcomes a formidable chal-
lenge; and the American Safety doctrine insures that whatever in-
formation might be collected would be biased. Yet, even if unbi-
ased information about arbitration outcomes were readily
available, it would still be difficult to marshal empirical proof be-
cause evaluating outcomes as correct or incorrect would be highly
problematic.
Accordingly, American Safety proponents support their posi-
tion not with data but with arguments. Arbitration is more likely
to yield incorrect decisions, they assert, because of the nature of
the process and the behavior of arbitrators. These arguments bear
a heavy burden since adjudicated outcomes of antitrust claims be-
tray an embarrassing degree of inconsistency and prompt a dis-
turbing number of logically flawed opinions. 6 They cannot bear it.
Indeed, they consist largely of the makeweights that courts em-
5 It also depends on the strength of the first link in the chain of logic underlying this
prediction, the diversion link. Problems beset that link similar to the ones that beset the
diversion link in the chain of logic underlying the "fewer published opinions" prediction.
6 See, e.g., McChesney, Law's Honour Lost: The Plight of Antitrust, 31 ANTITRUST
BULL. 359 (1986). McChesney analyzes the "courts' inability to distinguish procompetitive
from anticompetitive contracts," and concludes that "[tlhere can be no confidence ... that
judges will reach right results under the rule of reason standard." Id. at 366-70. McChesney
also criticizes the courts' "dogged adherence to per se rules, long after their rationales have
been shown erroneous." Id. at 365. In short, "[m]ost of the wrongheaded substantive rules of
antitrust are judge-made" and result in harm, demoralization and delegitimization of the
antitrust system. Id. at 366-67. "The resulting damage to the prestige of antitrust,"
McChesney concludes, "is inestimable." Id.
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bracing the doctrine have offered in support of it.
One of these arguments is that the judicial process is better
suited than the arbitral process to resolving the complex issues
sometimes raised by antitrust claims and to handling the diverse
and extensive evidence sometimes offered in connection with the
litigation of those claims.57 This argument is facially unsound.
Consider the problems posed by complex issues. The cure for
them, to the extent there is one, is expertise, and the arbitral pro-
cess is more likely than the judicial process to provide a healthy
dose of it. 8 The principal reason is that participants in the arbitral
processs can take effective steps to ensure that those who resolve
their disputes possess the requisite expertise,59 whereas the partici-
pants in the judicial process cannot. Participants in the arbitral
process can establish a pool of eligible arbitrators consisting largely
or exclusively of experts, adopt a mechanism for appointing arbi-
trators likely to result in the appointment of experts, and in the
event of an arbitration, actually appoint one or more experts to
serve as the decision-making panel. Not only can the participants
take these steps, they will have an incentive to do so whenever
they anticipate a continuing commercial relationship.
Participants in the judicial process exercise no comparable
powers. They can do almost nothing about the pool of eligible
judges. The pool, of course, consists entirely of sitting judges who
are appointed through the highly political process of presidential
appointment and senatorial consent. Parties can do little more
about the selection of a presiding judge. Obviously, they cannot
choose him outright; about as close as any participant can come is
to choose the district in which to file a claim. The exercise of that
power, however, is unlikely to cause the judicial process to bring
expertise to bear on complex issues because of three features of our
court system: (i) the law of jurisdiction and venue; (ii) multi-judge
districting; and (iii) the right to a jury trial. The laws of jurisdic-
tion and venue limit the situations in which a claimant will have a
choice about the district in which to file, and where he has one, it
", See Allison, supra note 16, at 244. "Two of the rationales employed by the American
Safety court, which subsequently have been reiterated by other courts and voiced by several
commentators, relate to the perceived lack of arbitrator expertise in dealing with antitrust
claims and the normal evidentiary complexity of antitrust cases." Id.
" See generally id. at 245 ("vast diversity of training and background among ...
arbitrators").
I" See id. at 245.
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will limit his options considerably. Multi-judge districting means
that choosing a district is tantamount to appointing the judge only
when a claimant chooses one of the three single-judge dis-
tricts-Guam, Vermont, and Wyoming; when a claimant chooses
one of the ninety multi-judge districts, the local court rules for as-
signing cases will come into play, and those rules tend to assign
antitrust cases to experts only by chance. The right to a jury trial
means that in any case where a jury is demanded, the presiding
judge, expert or not, must share decision-making authority with
non-experts. Besides, when a claimant does choose a district, he is
likely to do so for the purpose of securing the application of
favorable law or of fixing a site for the trial that is convenient for
himself and inconvenient for the other party; and if he did choose
a district for the purpose of obtaining a particular judge, he would
almost surely try to obtain one who was sympathetic, not expert.
Some American Safety proponents argue that the judicial pro-
cess is better suited than the arbitral process to resolving complex
issues not only because of the way it utilizes information but also
because of the way it generates information." The argument is
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for more exten-
sive discovery than does the Federal Arbitration Act, that the pro-
visions for more extensive discovery lead to the consideration of
additional evidence, and that the consideration of additional rele-
vant evidence increases the probability of correct decisions.61 The
argument is unpersuasive. Its premise is overstated, its reasoning is
flawed, and these problems aside, it simply does not show that ad-
judicating antitrust claims would be more efficient than arbitrating
them. The premise is overstated in that the difference in discovery
permitted under each statute is not as great as might appear at
first blush. The Federal Arbitration Act grants an arbitrator the
authority to compel witnesses to testify before him and bring "any
book, record, document, or paper which may be deemed material
as evidence in the case. ' '62 It also empowers district courts to en-
force his authority with mandatory injunctions and contempt cita-
10 See id. at 246. "The arbitral forum has also been criticized as inherently unsuitable
for the disposition of antitrust claims because of its traditionally minimal generation of evi-
dence" due to "the absence of compulsory discovery in arbitration." Id. See also Loevinger,
supra note 16, at 1090-91 (disadvantages of arbitral process as applied to antitrust issues).
11 See supra note 60.
62 9 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
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tions6 It is true that the Act grants arbitrators their authority
only in connection with proceedings before them-which would ap-
pear to make it of little value in terms of prehearing discovery-
but arbitrators may effectively circumvent this limitation by the
simple expedient of conducting prehearing proceedings.
The reasoning is flawed in two respects. First, it is not at all
clear that the provisions in the Rules for more extensive discovery
will lead to the consideration of additional relevant evidence. Par-
ties to adjudications may, and often do, cooperate in greater dis-
covery than that for which the Federal Arbitration Act provides.
They may do so because the arbitration clause in their agreement
so obligates them or because they fear the inferences that an arbi-
trator might draw from a failure to cooperate. Such discovery, of
course, is just as likely as statutorily-provided-for discovery to lead
to the consideration of relevant evidence.
The second flaw is that even if more extensive discovery were
to lead to the consideration of more relevant evidence, it is doubt-
ful that it would increase the probability of correct judicial deci-
sions. In fact, consideration of additional relevant evidence might
do just the opposite. Evaluating the credibility of evidence and as-
sessing its significance are difficult tasks. Beyond some threshold
quantity of evidence, these tasks become increasingly difficult, and
as they become more difficult, the probability that they will be per-
formed incorrectly rises. And, of course, performing these tasks in-
correctly might decrease the probability of correct decisions.
Even on its own terms, overstatement and flaws aside, this dis-
covery argument is unpersuasive. Assuming, arguendo, that the
discovery provisions in the Rules do increase the probability of a
correct antitrust decision, adjudicating antitrust claims might still
be less efficient than arbitrating them because the additional dis-
covery may cost more than the additional correct decisions are
worth. In fact, the additional discovery is likely to cost that much
because in many cases lawyers probably have an incentive to en-
gage in more than an optimal amount of discovery. A lawyer has
an incentive to engage in discovery up to the point where he ex-
pects that his risk-adjusted gains from the next unit of discovery
will just cover his costs. Because his gains and costs will often di-
verge from society's, he may respond to this incentive by engaging
in more than an optimal amount of discovery. A lawyer stands to
63 Id.
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gain, of course, from prevailing. Prevailing may bring him a contin-
gent fee or faster payment in full; it will certainly enhance his rep-
utation among clients, potential clients, and those who refer clients
to him. Prevailing, however, is hardly synonymous with a correct
decision, and some discovery will advance the former much more
than the latter. We would expect a lawyer to engage in such dis-
covery. Of course, we would not expect him to engage in it without
limit. Discovery is costly to the lawyer. First, it requires that he
forego other activities. Because his costs will often diverge from
society's, however, this constraint is unlikely to limit discovery to
the optimal amount. In fact, discovery may increase the
probability of prevailing precisely because the party opposing the
lawyer's client must bear a disproportionate share of its cost. Sec-
ond, a lawyer might have to forego future income if a client who
was billed by the hour were to become dissatisfied upon receiving a
bill for discovery-related legal services." Because of the difficulty a
client has in monitoring his lawyer's activities, however, there is
little reason to believe that this constraint would be much more
effective than the other one.
Now consider the problems posed by the diverse and extensive
evidence sometimes offered in connection with the litigation of an-
titrust claims. That the evidence is diverse means that even a deci-
sion-maker possessed of considerable expertise may not under-
stand the meaning and significance of all of it. The cure for this
problem, like the cure for the problem of complex issues, is exper-
tise-but, here, the expertise of people other than the decision-
maker.15 A non-expert arbitrator can probably utilize such exper-
tise more fully than can a non-expert judge. It is not that arbitra-
tors are more adept; it is that the rules governing the arbitral pro-
cess typically give them quite a bit more discretion in how to
proceed than the federal rules give to judges. That the evidence is
extensive means that the decision-maker will encounter more diffi-
culty organizing it and retrieving those items in which he is espe-
cially interested. The palliative for these problems-there probably
is no cure-is the use of nontraditional procedures, along with re-
lated technological devices, that will make it easier to perform
C" Not only might the dissatisfied client decline to pay the entire bill, he might fire the
lawyer, hire another one the next time he needed legal services, or inform other clients and
potential clients about his dissatisfaction.
11 Of course, the expertise of people other than the decision-maker could also help solve
the problem raised by complex issues.
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these tasks. Because the arbitrator has greater discretion than a
judge, the arbitral process could more readily accommodate these
procedures and devices than the judicial process. At the very least,
their use by an arbitrator would be subject to less scrutiny on ap-
peal than their use by a judge.
As the Supreme Court remarked in Mitsubishi, "adaptability
and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration.""s That is
why, if either process is better suited to resolving the complex is-
sues sometimes raised by antitrust claims and to handling the di-
verse and extensive evidence sometimes offered in connection with
the litigation of those claims, it would likely be-contrary to the
opinions of the courts embracing the American Safety doc-
trine-the arbitral, not the judicial, process.
Even if it were the judicial process, however, that would tell us
precious little about whether a court should order antitrust claims
to arbitration. Claims subject to arbitration clauses are unlikely to
raise complex issues or to call forth diverse and extensive evidence.
These claims typically challenge "vertical" restraints of trade-
limitations on competition in the distribution of goods. Unlike
cases involving "horizontal" restraints-like mergers between, or
cooperation among, erstwhile rivals-they do not "often occasion
the monstrous proceedings that have given antitrust litigation an
image of intractability. 6 7 Moreover, if any errors were attributable
to the nature of the arbitral process, they could not affect the
probability of a correct decision unless they systematically favored
antitrust defendants, and there is little reason to believe that they
would do so.
American Safety proponents do offer another argument to
support their position that arbitration of antitrust claims is more
likely than adjudication to yield incorrect decisions. The argument
is that arbitrators are less likely than judges to apply antitrust
law.' The proponents rely on two interrelated points. The first is
that arbitrators are not legally obligated to apply antitrust law ex-
8 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 633 (1985).
"The anticipated subject matter of the dispute may be taken into account when the arbitra-
tors are appointed, and arbitral rules typically provide for the participation of experts either
employed by the parties or appointed by the tribunal." Id.
67 Id.
68 "Applying antitrust law" includes permitting claimants to use judgments obtained by
the Department of Justice against the alleged offenders as prima facie evidence of liability
and refusing to permit alleged offenders to use defenses like in pari delicto and "passing
on."
[Vol. 62:1
ANTITRUST AND ARBITRATION
cept in the unlikely event that the relevant arbitration clause so
provides." It is not clear, however, whether this point survives the
Supreme Court's opinion in Mitsubishi. "The [arbitration] tribu-
nal . . . is bound to effectuate the intentions of the parties," ob-
served the Court.70 "Where the parties have agreed that the arbi-
tral body is to decide a defined set of claims which includes ...
those arising from the application of American antitrust law, the
tribunal should be bound to decide that dispute in accord with
the national law giving rise to the claim. 7 1 What makes this ob-
servation so far reaching is that the Court inferred that the parties
had "agreed that the arbitral body [was] to decide. . . claims...
arising from the application of American antitrust law" merely
from the parties' failure to expressly exempt such claims from the
scope of the arbitration clause in their agreement.7 2 The Court also
suggested that an arbitrator's failure to apply antitrust law might
justify a court's refusal to enforce the decision. "Having permitted
the arbitration to go forward, the national courts of the United
States will have the opportunity at the award-enforcement stage to
ensure that the legitimate interest in the enforcement of the anti-
trust laws has been addressed. 7 3 Indeed, such a failure might well
constitute "manifest disregard of law," an error that has tradition-
ally justified a refusal to enforce an arbitrator's decision. "4
Whether this point survives Mitsubishi or not, however, it
hardly shows that arbitrators are less likely than judges to apply
antitrust law. For even if arbitrators were not legally obligated to
apply antitrust law, they might do so anyway. In fact, they might
have a powerful incentive to do so: from their perspective, applying
antitrust law might well be the least costly method of ruling on
"I See Allison, supra note 16, at 242-44. "Arbitrators normally are not required to fol-
low pertinent rules of law precisely unless the parties have contractually created such an
obligation, and arbitrators' decisions are subject to little judicial review." Id. at 242.
70 Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636.
71 Id. at 636-37 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 636.
" Id. at 638.
71 See, e.g., Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International Mill, 401 F.2d 568, 572-73 (2d Cir.
1968) ("manifest disregard" of the law subject to judicial review); San Martine Compania
De Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals, Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961) ("mani-
fest disregard" occurs when arbitrators understand and state the law but do not apply it);
Dundas Shipping & Trading Co., Ltd. v. Stravelakis Bros., Ltd., 508 F. Supp. 1000, 1003
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) (judicial review "severely limited" when award is product of "manifest
disregard").
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antitrust claims.7 5 In terms of personal labor, it might be less
costly than developing an alternative set of principles and accept-
able modes of reasoning and then applying that set to the claim at
hand. And in terms of income from serving as an arbitrator in sub-
sequent proceedings, it might be less costly than any other method
of ruling on antitrust claims because applying antitrust law might
be most consistent with the well-counseled expectations of parties
to agreements containing broad scope arbitration clauses.
So it is that the proponents of the American Safety doctrine
make their second point, which seems to be that commercial arbi-
trators are likely to harbor hostility toward antitrust law. 6 I say
' See Landes & Posner, Private Good, supra note 17, at 248-50.
This alleged hostility is one of ihe two ideas that American Safety proponents may
have in mind when they argue that courts should not compel the arbitration of antitrust
claims because contracts containing a broad scope arbitration clause are likely to be con-
tracts of adhesion. "Adhesion" is a slippery concept. About all one can be sure of is that, for
a contract to qualify under that rubric, its terms must not be the product of explicit bar-
gaining between the parties. (This probably is a necessary but not sufficient qualification)
Why a lack of explicit bargaining would justify, on any grounds, a court's refusal to enforce
a contract's arbitration clause, or any clause for that matter, is far from clear. It certainly
does not justify such a refusal on antitrust grounds. Lack of explicit bargaining almost inva-
riably reflects the efficient operation of a competitive market. See R. POSNER, supra note 17,
at 102. Just as that kind of market drives sellers to offer higher valued products and to limit
their prices, it also drives them to economize on transaction costs. Id. For a seller of goods
that are purchased by a substantial number of people and are not custom tailored, doing
business on the basis of a standard form contract could serve as a rather effective method of
economizing on some of those costs. It will so serve as long as the terms of the contract are
efficient, and in a competitive market, one would certainly expect them to be.
It is conceivable, of course, that lack of explicit bargaining might simply reflect the
decision of a single firm with market power. Indeed, when judges bandy about the contract
of adhesion concept, they usually write as if they have that situation in mind-although
they almost always confuse market power with the number of zeros required to express the
value of the selling firm's assets. If lack of explicit bargaining were to reflect the decision of
a firm with market power, then it might give rise to an antitrust concern-but not necessa-
rily. The firm might simply be economizing on transaction costs. In fact that is the most
likely explanation for such a decision. If the firm were not economizing on transaction costs,
that would mean that the terms of the contract were inefficient. Doing business on the basis
of such a contract might lure potential rivals into the firm's market. In fact, it probably
would do so unless the firm somehow credibly threatened those potential rivals with the
prospect of suffering costs greater than those suffered by the firm. Only if doing business on
the basis of a standard form contract were ancillary to such a threat would the lack of
explicit bargaining give rise to an antitrust concern, and then the concern would be about
the terms of the contract, not about the process that produced them. It is difficult to see,
however, how a broad scope arbitration clause either in and of itself or in conjunction with
other terms of a contract could possibly serve this predatory function. Thus, even if all of
the contracts containing a broad scope arbitration clause that were likely to generate anti-
trust claims were contracts of adhesion, that would not justify a court's refusal to enforce
such a clause, at least not on antitrust grounds.
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"seems to be" because proponents have often expressed this point
in the form of colorful, but false, analogies that are more sugges-
tive than definitive. For example, the First Circuit put it this way:
"[just as] issues of war and peace are too important to be vested in
the generals,... decisons as to antitrust regulation of business are
too important to be lodged on arbitrators chosen from the business
community." 7 As far as I know, no one has ever marshalled any
empirical evidence to support the point, and my own research has
yielded not a shred. There probably is none since it is implausible.
In the first place, commercial arbitrators frequently come from the
law and academic communities as well as from the business com-
munity.7" In the second place, antitrust is not anti-business.Th For
that matter, businessmen are antitrust plaintiffs as well as anti-
trust defendants. In fact, of necessity, they will play both roles in
any antitrust litigation between parties to an agreement containing
a broad scope arbitration clause.
Even if arbitrators were to ignore antitrust law when ruling on
antitrust claims, their decisions would probably be correct on the
merits just about as often as judges' decisions. That is because it is
unlikely that the cases presented to them would involve an anti-
trust offense. Recall that the very existence of a written agreement
In fact, the contracts containing such a clause that are most likely to generate antitrust
claims-contracts for the distribution of goods-are especially unlikely to be contracts of
adhesion. Their terms are commonly the product of explicit bargaining. Thus, this argu-
ment, like the other two makeweights, bears little if any relevance to claims that are likely
to be subject to an arbitration clause.
The other idea that American Safety proponents may have in mind when they advance
this argument is simply that, in the name of distributing wealth in certain ways, judges
should sometimes permit parties who have voluntarily entered into agreements to welch on
their promises. This idea is consistent with much of the judicial and academic commentary
about contracts of adhesion. See, e.g., Chandler v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 374 F.2d
129, 135 n.11 (4th Cir. 1967); Standard Oil Co. v. Perkins, 347 F.2d 379, 383 n.5 (9th Cir.
1965); Keesler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REv. 629, 640-41 (1943); Macneil, Bureaucracy of Contracts of Adhesion, 22 Os-
GOODE HALL L.J. 5, 15-17 (1984). This is also consistent with the populist strand of antitrust
law. See infra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
7 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 162 (1st Cir.
1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (citing American
Safety Equip. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968)).
78 See AmERICAN MANAGEMENT Ass'N, RESOLVING BusiNEss DisPuTEs 68-69 (1965). This
study found that of the 20,000 arbitrators affiliated with the American Arbitration Associa-
tion, the largest single group was comprised of attorneys. Id.
70 The doctrine and the "public interest" argument advanced in support of it may re-
flect the opposite view: that antitrust law is a device for impairing business efficiency. See
infra notes 129-38 and accompanying text.
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containing an arbitration clause suggests the absence of both carte-
lization and predation.80 Recall, too, that antitrust claims subject
to an arbitration clause typically challenge a limitation on compe-
tition in the distribution of goods, and as post-American Safety
developments in antitrust law have confirmed, these vertical limi-
tations are quite unlikely to facilitate cartelization or predation.8'
In the absence of an antitrust offense, effectuating the agreement
of the parties would tend to maximize efficiency, and that is pre-
cisely what arbitrators who ignored antitrust law would do. These
decisions would therefore be consistent with what we assume here
is the purpose of antitrust law.82
Arbitrating antitrust claims is not more likely than adjudicat-
ing them to produce wrong decisions, and so once again, the propo-
nents of the American Safety doctrine are incorrect about the con-
sequence of compelling arbitration. It is not likely to cause a rise ii
the proportion of antitrust decisions that are incorrect on the mer-
its. They are also wrong about the likely significance of any such
rise. It would not reduce the deterrent effect of antitrust law.
To do that, the rise would have to cause an appreciable de-
cline in the risk of apprehension and convictionS-no small job
since the magnitude of this risk depends on a lot more than the
probability of an incorrect decision. It is quite unlikely that the
rise would be great enough to cause such a decline even if arbitrat-
ing an antitrust claim were several times as likely as adjudicating
one to produce an incorrect decision. The number of claims subject
to an arbitration clause would simply be too small. Could the rise
at least be great enough to cause an appreciable decline in the risk
of apprehension and conviction borne by a select group: the parties
to agreements containing an arbitration clause? Probably not. At
most, the rise could provide each such party with some relief from
1o See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
81 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-58 (1977) (dis-
cussion of "redeeming virtues" of vertical restriction such as limitations on intrabrand com-
petition). See also Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 ANT -
TRUST L.J. 135, 140-43 (1984) (various economic reasons why vertical restraint would not
facilitate cartelization); Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CH. L. REV. 6, 25 (1981) ("purely vertical restrictions on
intraband competition . . . are legal per se").
81 In fact, they would be consistent with the purpose of antitrust law regardless of how
it is defined. See infra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
83 See Breit & Elzinga, supra note 18, at 407-09 (discussing relationship between risk of
apprehension and conviction and the deterrence of criminal activity).
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the risk of antitrust prosecution by the other party to the agree-
ment. Relief from this risk, however, would provide little relief
from the risk of prosecution generally because non-parties, includ-
ing public enforcement agencies, could still bring suit. Unless the
rise provided this select group with substantial relief from the risk
of prosecution generally, it would have little impact on the risk of
apprehension and conviction borne by group members.
Like the "fewer published opinions" prediction, the "more in-
correct decisions" prediction is unlikely to come true. 4 If it were to
come true, the reduction in deterrence would be offset somewhat
by the fact that arbitral decisions rarely find their way into pub-
lished opinions. Moreover, whatever reduction did occur, it could
again be remedied by measures that were both more efficient and
more consistent with the Federal Arbitration Act than refusing to
compel antitrust claims to arbitration. For example, courts could
review arbitral decisions involving antitrust claims more closely
than other arbitral decisions which have traditionally been subject
to minimal appellate review.8 After all, the arguments offered by
the American Safety proponents merely raise the possibility of er-
ror, and courts have long dealt with that possibility through appel-
late review.8 Of course, appellate review would probably necessi-
tate a record of the proceedings and a written opinion from the
panel 1 Requiring these devices, which involve additional expense,
procedural niceties, formality and delay, would to some extent
' To the extent that the makeweights offered in support of this prediction reflect a
concern about the litigants in any particular case where the American Safety doctrine is
invoked-and courts often express them as if they do-they need not occupy us any longer.
If the parties wish to give up their interest in the "better suited" judicial process or in less
hostile judges in return for some other good of more value to them, there is no antitrust
related justification for preventing them from doing so. Even courts embracing the Ameri-
can Safety doctrine have recognized, in part, the validity of this waiver. They have created
an exception to the doctrine for situations where the parties agree to arbitrate their dispute
after the dispute arises. See, e.g., Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41, 47 (5th Cir. 1974) (post-
controversy arbitration agreements are not within the general prohibition laid down in
American Safety).
The exception itself shows that neither of these arguments requires that antitrust
claims be nonarbitrable. The timing of the arbitration agreement has nothing whatsoever to
do with the nature of the issues and evidence common to antitrust controversies or to the
propriety of entrusting their resolution to commercial arbitrators.
I' See Comment, supra note 54, at 813-16 (discussion of the reasons for changing the
tradition of subjecting arbitral decisions to limited appellate review).
80 Id. See also Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV 1986) (providing
judicial review of federal administrative agency action).
17 See Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214-15 (2d Cir. 1972).
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frustrate the purposes of arbitration, but not nearly as much as
refusing to compel it.
Courts could also compel arbitration conditionally. If the
problem were the allegedly inferior way in which the arbitration
process utilized information, courts could compel arbitration on
the condition that the parties select one or more antitrust experts
as the panel88 and permit that panel to use all procedures, and re-
lated technological devices, that a trial judge might use. If the
problem were the allegedly inadequate discovery authorized by the
Federal Arbitration Act, courts could compel arbitration on the
condition that the parties consent to the discovery devices author-
ized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 9 Lastly, if the prob-
lem were the alleged hostility of businessmen-arbitrators to anti-
trust law, the court could bar the parties from making businessmen
the majority of the arbitration panel or could itself vet the arbitra-
tor pool.90
If we were to experience the reduction in deterrence contem-
plated by the "more incorrect decisions" prediction, however, we
would probably have no efficiency-related reason for remedying it
at all because the reduction would itself probably be efficient. It
would be efficient because the reduction in deterrence would affect
only those practices that might be condoned by an arbitrator when
they would have been condemned by a judge. Most, if not all, of
these practices would cause either no net efficiency loss or a loss
whose value would be less than the value of the resources required
to challenge them as antitrust offenses. If offenses at all, these
practices would be what the "new learning" about optimal dam-
ages and deterrence identifies as "efficient violations."'"
There are two reasons why this is so. One is simply that only
cartelization and predation are at all likely to cause net efficiency
losses, and since an arbitration clause suggests the absence of both,
neither is likely to be involved in the cases that would be
presented to arbitrators.92 Unfortunately, antitrust claimants may
make colorable claims against practices that are neither ancillary
" In addition or in the alternative, courts could instruct arbitration panels on antitrust
law. See Allison, supra note 16, at 270.
See id. at 250-51.
9 See id. at 270.
See Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 445, 447 (1985);
Landes, supra note 18, at 653-61.
92 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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to cartelization nor predatory. The claimants who make them are
often those who would employ antitrust law to undo the verdict of
the marketplace, invalidate contractual limitations on business au-
tonomy, or gain negotiating leverage in an otherwise pedestrian
business dispute.
The second reason is a bit more complicated. Courts have cre-
ated a powerful incentive to attack practices that are, at worst, "ef-
ficient offenses." The incentive is the prospect of obtaining a
money judgment that far exceeds the net efficiency loss that they
cause. Courts have created this incentive by using the wrong mea-
sure of damages in cases where the alleged offender is sued by a
business rival or distributor. In such cases, courts use "lost profits"
as the measure of damages instead of the monopoly overcharge
which is the measure that they should use.9 3
Courts usually calculate "lost profits" as "the difference be-
tween a firm's 'costs' and its 'sales' for some period, discounted to
present value." '94 "Lost profits" calculated in this way tend to be
inversely proportional to whatever efficiency loss might be attribu-
table to a challenged practice.9 5 Suppose the efficiency loss is great
because the challenged practice drove a more efficient rival from
the market, thereby permitting the offender to earn monopoly
rents. The "lost profits" will be low or non-existent because the
driven-out rival could enter another market and earn the same
competitive return he had been earning in the offender's market.
Conversely, where the efficiency loss is small, the "lost profits" will
tend to be great. In fact, "lost profits" will tend to be greatest
when the challenged practice caused an efficiency gain-for exam-
93 Breit & Elzinga, supra note 18, at 410-12, 415-22; Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 462;
Landes, supra note 18, at 671. The monopoly overcharge measure is customarily used in
suits brought by consumers. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979)
(individual consumers may recover damages when they purchase goods at artificially in-
flated prices within the meaning of section 4 of Clayton Act).
'4 Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 462. "A terminated dealer will project how much it
would have sold had it not been cut off-a figure that usually is claimed to increase at an
exponential rate-and subtract its costs per unit, which are assumed to be constant or fall-
ing as sales increase." Id.
The value arrived at by the above process will be quite large. See, e.g., Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1240-44 (7th Cir. 1982) (jury determination that "lost
profits" were $3.5 million even though dealer's accounting profits had not exceeded $89,000
in any year before termination and terminated products only amounted to 20% of the busi-
ness based on evidence of pretermination profits appearing in trial record), aff'd on other
grounds, 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
" Easterbrook, Treble What?, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 95, 96 (1986).
1987]
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ple, by preventing distributors, including the antitrust claimant,
from earning monopoly rents.9
Because "lost profits" tend to be inversely proportional to the
efficiency loss attributable to a challenged practice, the prospect of
obtaining a money judgment equal to "lost profits" would probably
induce attacks on practices that were, at worst, efficient offenses.
The prospect of obtaining three times this amount plus the costs
of suit-as the Clayton Act provides-would almost certainly do
so. 97 Thus, these practices are the ones likely to be challenged in
cases where courts would use the "lost profits" measure of dam-
ages; cases where the alleged offender is sued by a business rival or
distributor.
These cases will encompass almost all of those in which one
party to an agreement containing a broad scope arbitration clause
pursues an antitrust claim against the other. Typically, one party
will be the rival of, or distributor for, the other. Of course, if courts
compelled the arbitration of antitrust claims, such cases would be
presented to arbitrators, if presented at all. So, practices that
might be condoned by an arbitrator even though they would have
been condemned by a judge would likely be, at worst, "efficient
offenses."
Curiously, the higher the probability that arbitrators would
make such an error, the more likely it is that practices challenge-
able in the cases presented to them would be, at worst, efficient
offenses. As the probability that arbitrators would make such an
error approaches one, the more an arbitration clause becomes a
waiver of the right to take antitrust enforcement action against the
other party to the agreement. No one is likely to waive such a right
unless he expected to gain by doing so.98 When could both parties
"6 See Breit & Elzinga, supra note 18, at 418 (asserting that the "lost profits" method
should be abolished because loss from an antitrust violation is "in the transaction costs
incurred in shifting resources from one market (or use) to another").
97 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Section 4 provides in pertinent part that "any person who
shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws.., shall recover three-fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
11 The reason, of course, is that the expected value of "rights" secured by the antitrust
laws is likely to be significantly greater than zero. That cannot be said about the expected
value of some of the "rights" secured by the securities laws. Take the right to obtain infor-
mation from a broker about an issuer. Since the same information will almost always be
available from other sources for free, the expected value of the right to obtain it from a
broker is likely to be close to zero. Thus, a potential investor might waive this right, even
though he expected to gain next to nothing by doing so.
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expect to gain? When each expected that the other would engage
in challengeable practices that were, at worst, efficient offenses. In
that situation, a joint waiver would permit them to share the gains
attributable both to whatever efficiencies were generated by their
challengeable practices and to the savings from foregoing antitrust
enforcement. Therefore, the higher the probability that an arbitra-
tor would condone what a judge would condemn, the higher the
probability that practices challengeable in cases presented to arbi-
trators would be, at worst, efficient offenses.
If any of these practices were "inefficient" offenses, it is un-
likely that arbitrators would condone them if judges would have
condemned them. In the first place, even if arbitrators were more
likely than judges to disregard antitrust law, the difference in their
proclivities would be quite small."' Secondly, if arbitrators were to
disregard antitrust law at all, they would probably disregard only
the populist strand of antitrust law-the strand embodied in cases
whose outcomes seemingly turned on populist notions about the
distribution of wealth-and failing to apply this populist strand
would have no impact on their treatment of inefficient offenses.
In fact, failing to apply this populist strand would tend to
maximize efficiency. The populist strand of antitrust law rests on
the notion that some agreements providing for voluntary exchange
should be condemned in order to prevent the distribution of
wealth in ways that would allegedly threaten certain loosely Jeffer-
sonian political and social goals.1"' An arbitrator might disregard
this strand because it would lead him to rule on antitrust claims in
a way that might well clash with the reasonable expectations of
parties to agreements containing an arbitration clause, and ruling
in that way would reduce the chances that such parties would
choose him to arbitrate their disputes.
One of the reasonable expectations of parties to such agree-
The securities laws appear to be predicated on the assumption that if all potential in-
vestors waived this right, the market would yield an inefficiently low level of accurate infor-
mation. So if a broad scope arbitration clause-appearing, for example, in a brokers' stan-
dard form customer agreement-constitutes such a waiver, one could argue on efficiency
grounds that, when it comes to securities claims, courts ought not to enforce the clauses.
Shearson/American Express, however, holds precisely to the contrary; and if courts should
enforce arbitration clauses when it comes to securities law claims, a fortiori they should
enforce them when it comes to antitrust claims.
00 See Allison, supra note 16, at 242-43 (asserting that arbitrators are likely to adhere
to basic spirit of antitrust laws because they have strong incentives to do so).
100 See infra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.
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ments is that in resolving disputes an arbitrator would try to effec-
tuate their agreement, but the populist strand of antitrust law
could easily lead him to frustrate it. Another of their reasonable
expectations is that an arbitrator would resolve disputes in a pre-
dictable pattern. Indeed, predictability is one of the features that
makes arbitration attractive; it permits parties to economize on
transaction costs by promising to arbitrate their disputes. The
populist strand of antitrust law, however, would likely yield resolu-
tions that followed no pattern at all. Too much would turn on
fuzzy factors like: which groups an arbitrator believed antitrust law
favors; whether the antitrust claimant "belonged" to a favored
group and the antitrust defendant to a non-favored one; and what
balance the arbitrator thought antitrust law strikes between effi-
ciency and favoring one group at the expense of another. More-
over, if parties to a commercial relationship really did include an
arbitration clause in their agreement for the purpose of evading
the judicial interpretation of antitrust law, they would certainly
expect that an arbitrator's interpretation would be more effi-
cient.1°1 Only this expectation would prompt the parties to bear
the expense of negotiating about the arbitration clause.
Two features of the arbitrator's mind set would work to rein-
force his incentive to disregard the populist strand of antitrust law.
One is the arbitrator's familiarity with the parties' agreement and
with the customs and practices of the market in which the parties
operate. This familiarity would make it easier for him to see how
each party reasonably expected to benefit from the agreement, and
that perception should reduce the appeal of the populist notion
that one party's expectations should be frustrated to prevent that
party from gaining "at the expense of" the other. The second fea-
ture is the arbitrator's knowledge that his decision will have little,
if any, precedential value. 102 This knowledge would tend to extin-
guish whatever naive hope which might otherwise have flickered
that his decision would affect the distribution of wealth
generally.'0"
... See Landes & Posner, Private Good, supra note 17, at 261-62. Making claims arbi-
trable would therefore limit any tendency toward inefficient interpretations of the law and
accelerate the opposite tendency. See id.
102 See Pitofsky, supra note 14, at 1076-77 (arbitrators not required to file a written
opinion and consequently consistent interpretations of antitrust law not possible).
"03 The hope would be naive because, even if the arbitrator's decision were to have
affected significant precedential value, those would blunt the decision's impact on wealth
distribution by taking the prospect of such a decision into account in arranging their affairs.
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3. The "Fewer Claims Pursued" Prediction
Finally, consider what is by far the most important, and most
plausible, prediction made by proponents of the American Safety
doctrine, "the fewer claims pursued" prediction. Its logic is that
compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims would divert to arbi-
tration some claims that would have been adjudicated on the mer-
its; this diversion would decrease the frequency with which prevail-
ing antitrust claimants obtained awards of treble damage and
attorneys' fees because arbitrators are less likely than judges to
make such awards; a decrease in the frequency of such awards
would, by reducing the incentive to pursue antitrust claims, cause
a decline in the number pursued; and a decline in the number of
claims pursued would reduce the deterrent effect of antitrust law.
Once again, problems beset each link in the logic. Take the
link between the diversion of claims to arbitration and the fre-
quency with which prevailing claimants obtain awards of treble
damages and attorneys' fees. This link rests on the assertion that
arbitrators would be more likely than judges to decline to make
such awards. This assertion suffers, though not severely, from
problems similar to the ones that plagued the assertion that arbi-
trators would be more likely than judges to fail to apply antitrust
law: Mitsubishi may obligate arbitrators to make awards of treble
damages and attorneys' fees; 04 and even if it does not, they may
have other incentives to do so. 105 Why does it not suffer as se-
verely? The relevant language of the Supreme Court's opinion in
Mitsubishi focuses more on whether arbitrators must let deserving
antitrust complainants prevail than on whether they must let pre-
vailing complainants have what they deserve. An arbitrator's in-
centive to make awards of treble damages and attorneys' fees to
prevailing claimants would not be nearly as strong as his incentive
to apply substantive antitrust law. An alternative standard would
be readily available and might even better conform to the expecta-
tions of the parties-single damages to the prevailing claimant
with each side bearing the cost of its own attorney.106
Now turn to the link between the frequency of treble damage
See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
' See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635
(1985).
105 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
"0 Often the parties to agreements containing arbitration clauses explicitly provide
that each side is to bear the cost of its own attorney.
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awards and the number of antitrust claims pursued. It is true, of
course, that a decrease in the frequency of these awards would re-
duce the expected gain from pursuing antitrust claims-although
only for claimants seeking damages, and many of those pursuing
antitrust claims subject to an arbitration clause seek only equitable
relief.1°7 That only means, however, that compelling these claims
to arbitration might reduce the number pursued by parties to
agreements containing a broad scope arbitration clause against one
another. It probably would not even do that because compelling
arbitration would not only reduce the expected gain from pursuing
an antitrust claim but also reduce the expected cost of pursuing
one. Recall that arbitrating antitrust claims would probably be
cheaper than adjudicating them, and it would almost certainly be
more cost effective. Ironically, perhaps, one of the factors giving
arbitration this advantage is that an arbitrator's decision would
have far less precedential value than a judge's. As a result, an al-
leged offender might devote significantly fewer resources to de-
fending a claim heard by an arbitrator than he would have devoted
had it been heard by a judge. 08 If fewer resources were devoted to
defending claims, the cost of pursuing them would decline, thereby
increasing the incentive to pursue them. In fact, if this counter-
vailing effect were great enough, compelling arbitration could re-
sult in more, rather than fewer, claims being pursued.10 In any
event, proponents of the American Safety doctrine are again
wrong about the likely consequence of compelling the arbitration
of antitrust claims.
Even if the proponents were right about this consequence,
they would still be wrong about the likely significance of a decline
in the number of antitrust claims pursued. In order to reduce the
deterrent effect of antitrust law, the decline would have to cause
an appreciable reduction in the risk of apprehension and convic-
tion." ' Yet, the number of claims subject to an arbitration clause
would almost certainly be too small to create even the potential for
10 See Allison, supra note 16, at 232.
108 See Landes & Posner, Private Good, supra note 17, at 261-62, 279-84.
100 In any event, compelling arbitration would probably not reduce greatly the number
of claims pursued in arbitration. When one party to an agreement containing an arbitration
clause has a colorable antitrust claim against the other, he almost always has other colorable
claims as well, and, in many cases, the additional cost of pursuing the antitrust claims would
be small enough so that even a reduction in expected gain of more than two-thirds would
not have much impact.
"1 See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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such a precipitous decline.
The "fewer claims pursued" prediction, then, is unlikely to
come true-but it is more plausible than the other two predictions.
Ironically, this plausibility weakens rather than strengthens the
case for the American Safety doctrine. If compelling arbitration
were to reduce the deterrent effect of antitrust law in the manner
contemplated by this prediction, the reduction in deterrence would
almost certainly be efficient. Consequently, there would be no effi-
ciency-related reason for remedying it, even with measures like
closer appellate review or conditional arbitration.11'
The explanation for this counterintuitive conclusion lies in the
"new learning" about optimal damages and deterrence. Damages
are "optimal" when they induce litigants to create an efficient level
of deterrence, a level at which the gain from any additional deter-
rence would fall short of the cost of creating it. 11 2 If apprehension
and conviction were certain and enforcement were costless, optimal
damages would equal the value of the "net harm [suffered as a re-
sult of the offense] to persons other than the offender."' ' 3 Of
course, the probability of apprehension and conviction is signifi-
cantly less than one and the cost of enforcement is substantially
more than zero-especially for antitrust offenses-so the measure
for optimal damages must be adjusted to take these facts into ac-
count.' 4 The adjustment takes the form of a multiplier." 5 For ex-
ample, optimal damages might equal triple the value of the net
harm suffered by persons other than the offender.
If the multiplier is too low, there will be too little deterrence.
Some offenses will be committed which could have been deterred
at a cost that was less than the value of the net harm. If the multi-
plier is too high, there will be too much deterrence. Some effi-
ciency-enhancing behavior will be foregone simply to avoid anti-
trust challenge;" 6 and some offenses will not be committed even
" See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing judicial review and condi-
tional arbitration alternatives).
"12 See Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968).
"' Landes, supra note 18, at 656.
11, See id. at 657.
, See id. A fundamental characteristic of the multiplier is that it is inversely propor-
tional to the probability of apprehension and conviction.
'16 See Austin, The Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflections on the
New Antitrust Strategy, 1978 DuKE L.J. 1353, 1369-70; Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforce-
ment and Economic Efficiency: The Uneasy Case for Treble Damages, 17 J.L. & ECON. 329,
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though the cost of deterring them exceeded the value of the net
harm.117 Moreover, some victims will behave perversely; in order to
maximize their hoped-for antitrust recovery, these victims will re-
frain from taking some steps that would have reduced their losses,
and may even take steps that will increase them.'-8
Obviously, the multiplier appropriate for one case would not
necessarily be appropriate for another. To illustrate, consider two
antitrust cases. Case #1 involves classic cartelization: the chief ex-
ecutive officers of the only three firms manufacturing widgets meet
clandestinely to set the price of widgets at no less than $10 each
and allocate output among the firms. Case #2 involves resale price
maintenance: the chief executive officer of the firm with a widget
monopoly enters into written agreements with the chief executive
officer of each of the two widget distributors pursuant to which the
distributors obligate themselves to sell widgets for no less than $10
each. The multiplier for Case #1 should be higher than the one for
Case #2 because it is easier to conceal classic cartelization than
resale price maintenance. The easier it is to conceal the offense,
the lower the probability of apprehension and conviction; and the
lower the probability of apprehension and conviction, the higher
should be the multiplier for calculating optimal damages."'
If we knew what the appropriate multiplier was, then we could
easily assess the efficiency of the reduction in deterrence contem-
plated by the "fewer claims pursued" prediction. In fact, we could
make the assessment even if all we knew was whether it was closer
to the multiplier presently employed by courts or to the one that,
according to American Safety proponents, arbitrators would often
employ. If it were closer to the multiplier presently employed by
the courts, we would conclude that the present level of deterrence
is probably more nearly optimal than the level that American
340-44 (1974) [hereinafter Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement]; Breit & Elzinga, supra
note 18, at 433-35. The size of this "misinformation effect" depends upon how difficult it is
to predict liability: both guilt or innocence and the size of an adverse judgment. See Breit &
Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement, supra, at 342.
.. See Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 447; Landes, supra note 18, at 656.
18 See Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 116, at 339-40; Breit &
Elzinga, supra note 18, at 430-33. The higher the probability of apprehension and convic-
tion, the greater are the incentives to behave perversely. See Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust
Enforcement, supra note 116, at 339-40; Breit & Elzinga, supra note 18, at 430-33. For a
discussion of the probability of apprehension and conviction for practices likely to be chal-
lengeable before arbitrators, see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 115.
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Safety proponents predict would exist if courts compelled the arbi-
tration of antitrust claims; and a reduction from the present level
to the predicted level would be inefficient. We would reach the op-
posite conclusion, however, if the appropriate multiplier were
closer to the multiplier that, according to American Safety propo-
nents, arbitrators would often employ.
Unfortunately, we do not have the data to "prove" that it is
closer to one than the other.12 What we do have, however, is the
characteristics of cases likely to be arbitrated, and the "new learn-
ing" shows that the appropriate multiplier is a function of some of
these characteristics."2 The most important characteristic is the
difficulty of concealing the alleged offense. In cases likely to be ar-
bitrated, the alleged offender would probably find it almost impos-
sible to conceal his alleged offense. At the very least, the alleged
victim would very likely know all about it. Once again, the more
difficult it is to conceal the offense, the higher is the probability of
apprehension and conviction; and the higher the probability of ap-
prehension and conviction, the lower the appropriate multiplier.'22
A second significant characteristic is the relative concentration
of property rights in antitrust enforcement.2 13 In cases likely to be
arbitrated, these rights will tend to be relatively concentrated.
They will not be shared, for example, by hundreds of end users.
The more concentrated the property rights in enforcement, the
more likely it is that one of the right holders would take enforce-
ment action; and the more likely it is that one of the right holders
would take enforcement action, the higher the probability of ap-
prehension and conviction and the lower the appropriate
multiplier.
A third significant characteristic is the probability of a deci-
sion that will condemn an efficiency enhancing practice as an anti-
trust offense-what Professors Breit and Elzinga call the "misin-
formation effect."' 24 In cases likely to be arbitrated, the probability
of this kind of error is relatively high simply because almost all of
the claims in such cases will challenge "vertical restraints of trade"
20 See Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 448-55.
121 See id. at 454-61.
122 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
1 See Easterbrook, supra note 91, at 459 (discussing concentration of the property
right in enforcement as one of determinants of appropriate multiplier).
124 See Breit & Elzinga, Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 116, at 340; Breit & Elz-
inga, supra note 18, at 433.
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or other forms of contractual integration, and these practices are
rather likely to be efficiency enhancing.125 Condemning efficiency
enhancing behavior is one of the costs of enforcement, and the
higher the cost of enforcement, the lower the appropriate
multiplier.
These three characteristics are reinforced by the fact that em-
ploying a lower multiplier would probably not induce anyone to
take inefficient precautions to insulate themselves from the effects
of antitrust offenses. In cases likely to be arbitrated the party with
an antitrust claim would almost always be able to seek full redress
under some other law for any wrong suffered at the hands of the
alleged offender. Additionally, end users would have no reason to
substitute away from the products or services provided by parties
to agreements containing a broad scope arbitration clause.
In my judgment, these characteristics strongly indicate-they
cannot "prove"-that the appropriate multiplier is closer to one,
the explicit multiplier that, according to American Safety propo-
nents, arbitrators would often employ, than it is to three, the ex-
plicit multiplier employed by courts. In fact, they need not indi-
cate even that much in order to show that the reduction in
deterrence contemplated by the fewer claims pursued prediction
would be efficient. Recall that in cases between parties to an agree-
ment containing a broad scope arbitration clause, courts are likely
to measure "actual damages" in terms of "lost profits."' 26 This
measure tends to dramatically overstate the harm, and overstating
this harm is the equivalent of employing an implicit multiplier.
Thus, in these cases the multiplier employed is equal to the ex-
plicit one times the implicit one. To illustrate, suppose that "lost
profits" overstate net harm merely by a factor of two. Courts
would then employ a multiplier of six (three times two) and arbi-
trators, according to American Safety proponents, a multiplier of
two (two times one). If the characteristics of cases likely to be arbi-
trated indicated only that the appropriate multiplier was closer to
two than to six, we could still conclude that the reduction in deter-
rence contemplated by the "fewer claims pursued" prediction
would be efficient.
See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
128 See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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C. Summary of Part I
The analysis of the purported efficiency losses reveals that
compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims is unlikely to reduce
the deterrent effect of antitrust law in any of the ways predicted
by the proponents of the American Safety doctrine. It further
reveals that if compelling arbitration were to cause such a reduc-
tion, this reduction would probably be efficient. This purported ef-
ficiency loss is, if anything, a subtle efficiency gain.
To these two efficiency gains we must add a third. When, pur-
suant to the American Safety doctrine, a court refuses to compel
the arbitration of an antitrust claim, it must then decide whether
to permit or to stay the arbitration of nonantitrust claims.127 To do
that, the court must ascertain whether the antitrust claim "perme-
ates" the dispute and whether the party pursuing it is likely to
prevail.128 This is an onerous task. If courts were to compel the
arbitration of antitrust claims they would free the resources now
devoted to performing that task and simultaneously relieve busi-
nessmen of considerable uncertainty.
II. THE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION CONSEQUENCES OF COMPELLING
THE ARBITRATION OF ANTITRUST CLAIMS
For the past decade, efficiency has been ascendant as the
touchstone of antitrust jurisprudence, but not all are happy with
this state of affairs. 29 Some scholars still argue that, and some
judges still resolve antitrust claims as if, the policy of antitrust law
is some combination of maximizing efficiency and distributing
wealth in ways that, these scholars and judges assert, will further
some loosely Jeffersonian political and social goals. This populist
notion can trace its lineage at least as far back as Justice Brandeis'
opinion for the Court in Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v.
United States,3 0 and at times since, it has had great influence. In
fact, the American Safety doctrine was probably a naive extension
of this populist notion.
The American Safety decision came down during the last pe-
127 See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 723 F.2d 155, 169
(1st Cir. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
128 Dixstein v. Dupont, 443 F.2d 783, 786-88 (1st Cir. 1971).
129 See Rosenfield, supra note 46, at 49.
130 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
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riod of populist ascendancy in antitrust law.131 Indeed, the influ-
ence of populist notions was probably at its peak. The opinion re-
flects this influence. Into the language with which the Court
expressed its principal argument the Court inserted a classic popu-
list nostrum-"inferior bargaining position": "we find in this case
[a] conflict between federal statutory protection of a large seg-
ment of the public, frequently in an inferior bargaining position,
and encouragement of arbitration as a 'prompt, economical and ad-
equate solution of controversies.' ,,I2 The Court also invoked a re-
lated populist nostrum, "contracts of adhesion," in support of the
doctrine.133 What is perhaps most indicative of the doctrine's pop-
ulist parentage is that the courts embracing it created an exception
for situations where the parties agree to arbitrate their dispute af-
ter the dispute arises.134 If there really were a conflict between
"federal statutory protection of a large segment of the public...
and encouragement of arbitration as a[n] ... 'economical... solu-
tion of controversies,' ,,1s5 the conflict would be just as great
whether the agreement preceded the dispute or followed it. For
that matter, the temporal relationship between the dispute and the
agreement has nothing to do with whether the judicial process is
better suited than the arbitral process to handling an antitrust
claim, or whether judges are really more likely than arbitrators to
apply antitrust law. If the doctrine were rooted in concerns about
efficiency, the exception could not be reconciled with it; but it
could if the doctrine was an extension of populist notions about
the distribution of wealth-notions that are notoriously malleable.
The doctrine is a naive extension, however, since compelling
the arbitration of antitrust claims would probably have a negligible
impact on the distribution of wealth. Consider the likely impact of
refusing to compel it. In the first place, it is quite likely that in
... See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); Albrecht v. Her-
ald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967);
United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13
(1964).
..2 See American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir.
1968). It is true that if the customers of a firm with significant market power tried to take
collective action to obtain a greater output at no higher price, they would incur prohibitive
transaction costs. This condition is the sine qua non of "significant market power." But it is
not the condition to which American Safety proponents refer when they write about "infer-
ior bargaining position."
"3' See id. at 827.
134 See supra note 84.
13' American Safety, 391 F.2d at 826.
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arranging their commercial relationships, parties to agreements
containing an arbitration clause act as if they take the American
Safety doctrine into account. By acting this way, the parties would
blunt any impact that the policy of refusing to compel arbitration
might otherwise have had on the distribution of wealth between
them. 136 Secondly, even on the assumption that the parties do not
act this way, refusing to compel arbitration could not have an ap-
preciable impact on the distribution of wealth unless those who
stood to gain and those who stood to lose from this policy belonged
to distinct wealth groupings, one of which was supposedly favored
by antitrust law and the other disfavored. 37 It is impossible to be-
lieve that they would do so. In fact it is impossible to believe that
they would belong to distinct wealth groupings of any kind. Parties
to agreements containing a broad scope arbitration clause must
find that in some situations a refusal to compel arbitration would
benefit them (in the short run) and in other situations it would
hurt them.
Thirdly, if we assumed not only that these parties do not act
as if they take the doctrine into account, but also that those who
stood to gain and those who stood to lose from the policy of refus-
ing to compel arbitration belonged to the required wealth group-
ings, then this policy could affect the distribution of wealth only on
select occasions. The occasions would be those in which one party
objected to the arbitration of a dispute and a court properly sus-
tained the objection solely on the basis of the American Safety
doctrine. Such occasions are unlikely to arise frequently. Parties to
agreements containing an arbitration clause do not often object to
the arbitration of disputes; and when such a party does object, a
court may sustain the objection on the basis that the arbitration
clause was the product of fraud, duress, or overreaching. 8'
Thus, refusing to compel the arbitration of antitrust claims
probably has a negligible impact on the distribution of wealth.
This implies that compelling the arbitration would probably do
likewise. It would, however, produce sizable efficiency gains, and so
it would further the policy of antitrust law even if that policy were
"6 See A. POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 107-09 (1983).
17 See id. at 111-12.
"I See, e.g., Mosely v. Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc., 374 U.S. 167, 171 (1963)
(courts will not enforce an arbitration agreement procured by fraud); Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v.
Louis Dreyfus Corp., 372 F.2d 753, 756 (2d Cir. 1967) (arbitration agreement obtained
through duress is revocable).
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some combination of maximizing efficiency and distributing wealth
in populist preferred ways.
III. CONCLUSION
This reconsideration of the American Safety doctrine shows
that compelling the arbitration of antitrust claims is likely to fur-
ther the policy of antitrust law regardless of how that policy is de-
fined. This showing is utterly inconsistent with the central premise
upon which the doctrine is founded. We may therefore conclude
that not only does the doctrine have perverse consequences and
lack statutory support, it is also without logical foundation. The
courts ought to discard it.1"'
' In Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), Judge Knapp did discard the American Safety doctrine. Id. at 980. In September
1985-after the Court had decided Mitsubishi-Seiko Time pursued claims against one of
its dealers, Gemco Latinoamerica, by demanding arbitration as provided in their distribu-
tion agreement. Id. at 974. Gemco asserted a number of affirmative defenses and filed coun-
terclaims against Seiko Time. Id. When the arbitrators awarded Seiko all that it had sought,
Gemco recast its counterclaims to sound in antitrust (among other things) and attempted to
pursue them in court. Id. at 975. Seiko Time moved to dismiss the recast counterclaims on
the ground that the arbitration award barred them. Id. at 977. Gemco argued that the award
could not bar its antitrust claims because, under American Safety, it could not pursue them
in arbitration. Id. at 978. Judge Knapp rejected the argument on the theory that, after
Mitsubishi, "none of the justifications for the ... doctrine retain their vigor and that [the
American Safety] court would now hold that domestic antitrust claims are subject to arbi-
tration." Id. at 980.
